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Insult to Injury: A Disability-Sensitive
Response to Smolensky's Call for Parental Tort
Liability for Preimplantation Genetic
Interventions
ALICIA R. OUELLErrE*
Professor Kirsten Rabe Smolensky's article, Creating Children with
Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic
Interventions, adds a new dimension to the ethical and legal debate about
the genetic manipulation of embryos. Engaging in a thoughtful analysis,
Professor Smolensky argues that children who were subject to
preimplantation genetic manipulation should have the ability to sue their
parents for damages when the parents "directly intervene in the child's
DNA, and consequently cause that child to suffer a disability that limits
the child's right to an open future."' The article raises a number of
questions. Can a parent or healthcare provider inflict a legally cognizable
harm on an embryo before it is implanted, when the same parent or
provider could dispose of the embryo without penalty? What is the moral
and legal status of an embryo that exists outside of the womb? If a child
can be harmed by something done to it as an ex-utero embryo, what is
the harm? Is the tort system an appropriate vehicle for addressing
preventable prenatal genetic injury? If the tort system is appropriate, is it
the parents who should be held responsible for damages to the child, or
would the responsibility be better placed on the health care providers or
lab technicians who altered the genetic codes of the embryo?
In addressing these and other issues, Professor Smolensky singles
out as the "key question" identifying "which modified phenotypes
constitute legally cognizable harms."2 I am writing to address that
question and Professor Smolensky's response to it. In particular, this
* Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School; Professor of Bioethics, Union/Mt. Sinai
School of Medicine Program in Bioethics. Many thanks to Kirsten Rabe Smolensky for inviting this
response, and to Shannon Nessier for her extraordinary efforts to make the response possible.
i. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for
Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 6o HASTINGS L.J. 299, 299 (2008).
2. Id. at 301.
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Essay addresses the implications for persons with disabilities of the
argument that the test for compensable harm in genetically modified
children is the presence of a disability.3 After considering the argument
from a disability rights perspective, and assuming, for sake of argument,
that tort damages should be made available to a child who was the
product of genetic interventions, I conclude that damages should not be
limited to cases in which the intervention caused physical disability.
Limiting damages to cases in which a child is born with a disability
unnecessarily and inaccurately devalues life with disability, and leaves
unprotected children whose DNA is shaped for traits other than
disability at the request of their parents. As an alternative, I suggest an
approach for delineating cognizable injury that supports much of
Professor Smolensky's argument, but is deliberately sensitive to disability
issues. This approach treats genetic modifications for disability like other
genetic modifications that shape a future child for cultural, aesthetic, or
social reasons,' and identifies as unreasonable the harm caused and risks
posed by use of direct genetic interventions that provide no therapeutic
benefit to the potential child.
I. DISABILITY AS HARM
Professor Smolensky identifies physical disabilities such as deafness
and achondroplasia as legally compensable injuries when they are
inflicted on children by direct genetic manipulation of their DNA.' Her
analysis explicitly adopts from moral philosophy an "open future"
approach for defining cognizable injury. Under the open future
approach, a child suffers a moral harm when a third party's actions
unreasonably limit the child's life plans.7 Cognizable losses occur only
when the "doomed interests" are basic, "natural primary goods," such as
"hearing, movement, and minimal mental capacity." 8 Third party actions
that cause minimal losses, and or those that increase a child's life options,
do not cause cognizable harm because they do not place unreasonable
limitations on the child's future opportunities for important life activities
like marriage, reproduction, and employment. By contrast, a parent who
causes deafness, blindness, or achondroplasia in a child has harmed the
child by depriving him or her of natural primary goods "known to be
indispensable to a decent life."9
3. 1 also take issue with the notion that it is the parents, and not the medical professionals and
facilities, with whom responsibility should lie, but for purposes of argument I will put that point aside.
4. As Professor Smolensky notes, the technology does not yet exist to add or subtract particular
traits from a child's genetic code. See Smolensky, supra note I, at 303.
5. Id. at 302.
6. Id. at 309,311.
7. Id. at 3o, 309.
8. Id. at 310.
9. Id. at 309 (quoting I JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO
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Smolensky acknowledges that no bright line identifies the point at
which a child's right to an open future is unreasonably impaired, but she
argues that the line is always crossed by the infliction of traits that limit a
child's functioning.'" The infliction of "genetic traits such as deafness and
achondroplasia," she explains, "are almost certain to be considered
offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity."" In this way,
"genetically modifying an embryo's naturally occurring set of DNA to
choose a particular genetic trait, say deafness, is similar to removing a
newborn's hearing via surgical procedure."' 2  The intervention
unreasonably limits life opportunities for the modified child. 3
Under an open future framework, the presence of disability is always
a harm to be avoided. Professor Smolensky argues, however, that only
those disabilities caused by direct genetic intervention constitute legally
cognizable injuries."' Damages are unavailable for children whose
embryos were selected for implantation based on the presence of a
naturally occurring gene in their DNA, because the only alternative to
life with disability for those children was nonexistence (the Parfit Non-
Identity Problem).'5 By contrast, children who were subjected as embryos
to direct manipulation of their DNA had an alternative to nonexistence
or life with disability. They could have been born with the ability or trait
that the genetic modification took away. The child now affected with
deafness could have had the ability to hear, or the child now affected
with dwarfism the ability to grow. The interventions cost them the
opportunity of living a better life in which the breadth of available
careers and activities are unlimited.
II. THE INSULT PROBLEM
Although I often disagree with the reactionary response of some
disability rights activists to perceived slights, 6 I believe it essential to
consider the perspective of the disability community whenever discussing
law or policy that affects or concerns persons with disabilities. Not only
do people with disabilities have the most at stake in the discussions,
OTHERS 99 (1984)).
to. Seeid. at311.
ii. Id. at 319-2o.
12. Id. at 334.
13. Dena Davis also argues that inflicting deafness on a child harms the child by limiting his or
her right to an open future. See Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child's Right to an Open
Future, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 549,566-67 (1997).
14. Smolensky, supra note 1, at 299.
15. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351-79 (rev. ed. 1987); Smolensky, supra note i, at
335-36.
16. See, e.g., Alicia Ouellette, Disability and the End of Life, 85 OR. L. REV. 123, 126-28 (2006);
Alicia Ouellette, Growth Attenuation, Parental Choice, and the Rights of Disabled Children: Lessons
from the Ashley X Case, 8 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y (forthcoming Jan. 2009).
December 2008]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
disability scholars are experts in identifying and preventing social
oppression of people with disabilities. Professor Smolensky's analysis
singles out physical disability as "offensive to a reasonable sense of
personal dignity."' 7 From the disability perspective, this argument is
problematic.
Disability studies is a rich and varied field that emphasizes the
dignity and value of life with disability, and identifies social oppression of
people with disabilities. Its scholars reject the notion that life with
disability is inherently tragic, and they urge abolition of societal barriers
that prevent people with physical impairments from leading full lives.'9 A
central tenet of disability studies is the rejection of the medical model of
disability as a foundation for effective understanding of impairment or
disability." "The medical view of disability.., treats the individual as
deficient and inherently inferior because she falls below an arbitrary
physiological standard that delineates social acceptance and that can only
be 'normalized' and incorporated into society through a medical cure."'"
Disability is problematic in the medical model because "impairment[] of
normal species functioning reduce[s] the range of opportunity open to
the individual... [to] construct [a] 'plan of life' or 'conception of the
good .... .In this way, the medical model "expressly locates the 'problem'
in the disabled person.23
Disability scholars make a strong case that the medical model of
disability harms people with disabilities. They persuasively link the
medical model of disability to the eugenics movement, lifetime
institutionalization, forced sterilization, and research abuses. 4 They
explain that so long as the cultural perception is that people with
disabilities are inferior, and their lives limited by their disabilities, people
with disabilities will face continued marginalization and oppression.25
17. Smolensky, supra note i, at 319-20.
18. See Gaeth Williams, Theorizing Disability, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES 123, 124
(Gary L. Albrect et al. eds., 2ooi).
19. See, e.g., ANITA SILVERS ET AL., DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION 94-95 (1998)
("Recognizing how hostile environments, not personal deficits, disable people whose physical, sensory,
or cognitive states are different from those of the dominant class is central to having a disability
perspective.").
20. Id.
21. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of
Federal Legislation and Social Policy for Persons with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1348 (I993);
see Adrienne Asch, Disability, Bioethics, and Human Rights, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILnTY STUDIES,
supra note I8, at 297, 300.
22. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE: STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND HEALTH POLICY 27 (1985).
23. Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1044 (2004).
24. See, e.g., SILVERS ET AL., supra note i9, at 67-74 (describing "medicalizing's horrible history").
25. See, e.g., id. at 95, 142 ("[T]he assumption that to be impaired is to suffer" results in a
framework that does "not offer an avenue for equalizing people with disabilities," and "false theories
positing" the incompetence of persons with disabilities create[] conditions hostile to the
[Vol. 6o:397
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In place of the medical model, disability scholars urge various social
models of disability in which disability is a socially constructed
condition.26 In the social model of disability, a person with a physical
impairment has the same inherent ability to lead a fulfilling life as does
anyone else.27 It is social barriers that disable the person." Architectural,
attitudinal, sensory, political, and economic barriers prevent people with
disabilities from full participation in society. 9 Thus, the social model
places the problem with disability (and the corresponding obligation for
correcting the problem), on societal and political institutions, not the
person with the physical impairment."
The central lesson taught by disabilities studies is that life with
disability is not inherently limited or tragic. Empirical research
documents the high value attributed to their own lives by people who live
with disability." Narrative accounts of individual lives demonstrate that
for many people, a physical impairment adds such richness and texture to
life that the trait is considered a gift.3" By debunking the myth of the
tragedy of life with disability, these studies support the use of the social
model of disability as a tool for understanding how impairments affect
people.
Professor Smolensky's argument runs directly against the central
tenets of disability studies. It employs a medical model of disability in
which a child born with deafness or dwarfism is a damaged good with
limited life options. It perpetuates the notion that life with disability is
tragic by adopting a framework in which the presence of a disabling trait
is viewed as "dooming of [the child's] future interests to total
defeat."33And it does nothing to account for the fact that some people
experience a disabling trait as enriching their lives.
manifestation of competence by people whose bodies or intellects differ from the commonplace, while
simultaneously adducing the resulting absence of signs of their competence in its own defense."); see
also JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT Us WITHOUT Us: DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT
69-82 (2000).
26. SILVERS ET AL., supra note 19, at 74-76.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Asch, supra note 21, at 301 (citing eleven such studies); see also NAT'L ORG. ON DISABILrrY
& LOUIS HARRIS & Assocs., INC., N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS 9i-96 (1994); Saroj
Saigal et al., Self-Perceived Health Status and Health-Related Quality of Life of Extremely Low
Birthweight Infants at Adolescence, 276 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 453, 456 (1996).
32. See HARRIET McBRYDE JOHNSON, Preface of Too LATE TO DIE YOUNG: NEARLY TRUE TALES
FROM A LIFE 1-5 (2005) (providing a wonderful example). See generally ERIc PARENS ET AL.,
SURGICALLY SHAPING CHILDREN: TECHNOLOGY, ETHICS, AND THE PURSUIT OF NORMALITY (2006); SILVERS
ET AL., supra note I9, at 89 (explaining how "missing one kind of experience can enhance the quality of
the remaining kinds"); Deborah Kent, Somewhere a Mockingbird, in PRENATAL TESTING AND
DISABILITY RIGHTS 57-63 (Eric Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000).
33. Smolensky, supra note 1, at 309 n.57 (quoting FEINBERG, supra note 9, at 98).
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That is not to say that Professor Smolensky lacks respect for people
with disabilities. To the contrary, I read her article as a laudable effort to
provide compensatory relief to children who may well have been
damaged by their parents' actions. Indeed, I agree with her that children
may be harmed by the manipulation of their DNA for purposes of
creating a disability. But the analytic path she takes implicitly reinforces
negative societal perceptions about disability. As the disability rights
community has long recognized, "'[b]enevolence' and 'good intentions'
have often had disastrous consequences for the disability community.
Throughout history, 'for their own good' has motivated and justified
discrimination against us."34 Consideration of the disability perspective in
the context of preimplantation genetic modification may help prevent a
repetition of that history.
In any event, the implication that people with disabilities are
damaged goods flows directly from the invocation of Joel Feinberg's
conception of the right to an open future to define an actionable injury.35
In his work, Feinberg unabashedly accepts as true the myth of the
tragedy of life with disability. He asserts that a newborn child born with
blindness, deafness, or permanent paralysis has "[]impaired faculties that
are essential to the existence and advancement of any ulterior
interests. ', 36 He describes such conditions as "so far below a reasonable
minimum as to be inescapably degrading and sordid. '37 He suggests that
being born with a disability "is not merely to have 'bad luck.' It is to be
dealt a card from a stacked deck in a transaction that is not a 'game' so
much as a swindle. 38
Feinberg's characterizations of life with disability are as inaccurate
as they are demeaning. Many people with disabilities are able to advance
their "ulterior interests" and have successful careers, participate in their
communities, and raise families. 39 Their physical impairments do not
prevent them from participating in important life activities, although
social barriers may. The notion that people living with disabilities have
been cheated of a quality life is refuted by the evidence gathered by
disability scholars showing that people with disabilities place no less
34. Disability Rts. Edu. & Def. Fund, Modify the System Not the Person, Jan. 7, 2007, http://
www.dredf.org/news/ashley.shtml.
35. See Joel Feinberg, A Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS,
PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., i98o). But see
SILVERS ET AL., supra note 19, at 92-94 (criticizing the open future approach from a disability
perspective).
36. FEINBERG, supra note 9, at 98.
37. Id. at 99.
38. Id.
39. Disabled World, Famous People with Disabilities (May i8, 2006), http://www.disabled-
world.com/artman/publish/articleoo6o.shtml (listing short biographies of famous people with
disabilities).
[Vol. 6o:397
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value on the quality of their lives than do people with full physical
abilities, that people lacking disabilities grossly underestimate the value
of life with disability, and that traits like deafness, blindness, and
achondroplasia may enrich people's lives.'a
Wholesale adoption of Feinberg's open future approach may well
have the unintended effect of reinforcing negative societal perceptions
about disability in a way that further marginalizes and alienates the
disability community. At the very least, its adoption is likely to cause
offense.
III. DISABILITIES ARE NOT THE ONLY GENETICALLY INDUCED TRAITS
THAT CAN HARM CHILDREN
The insult problem is not the only limitation of a framework that
recognizes as harmed only those children born with manufactured
disabilities. That framework does not recognize the harms that will be
suffered by children inflicted with genetic traits other than disabilities.4
Consider, for example, a child born after her DNA was modified so that
she would have light skin instead of the dark skin that would have
manifested had she grown up with unaltered DNA.4" Consider another
child whose genes were modified to turn him from gay to straight.4'
Under Feinberg's open future approach, these children suffered no
harm. Black skin color and homosexuality are surely not traits "known to
be indispensable to a decent life."4" The modifications would not limit the
range of activities, careers, and opportunities that the child has open to
her. If anything, under Feinberg's test, being made white or straight
opens opportunities for the child because white people face less
discrimination in the work place than do people of color, and
homosexuals face legal barriers to marriage.
Nonetheless, the child whose DNA was modified to produce a
certain skin color or sexual orientation has suffered harm. First, there is
moral harm. The parent who seeks to add, delete, modify, or substitute a
genetic trait in the potential child for their own social, aesthetic, or
cultural reasons has treated the potential child as a property to be
40. See Asch, supra note 21, at 301 (citing eleven studies on the quality of life of people with
disabilities).
41. Just as the technology to implant a disability gene in an ex-utero embryo is not yet available,
the ability to make the other genetic modifications I discuss is not and may never be available.
42. There is no reason to believe that such a modification is technically feasible.
43. Again, this example is hypothetical only. That said, there is research being done in sheep to
determine the biologic basis of sexual orientation and the possibility it can be manipulated. See K.L.
Pinckard et al., Influence of Castration and Estrogen Replacement on Sexual Behavior of Female-
Oriented, Male-Oriented, and Asexual Rams, 78 J. ANIMAL SC. 1947, 1947 (20OO), available at
http://jas.fass.org/cgi/reprint/78/7/I947?maxtoshow=&HITS=io&hits=io&RESULTFORMAT=&sear
chid= &FIRSTINDEX=o&volume=78&firstpage= 1947&resourcetype=HWCIT.
44. FEINBERG, supra note 9, at 99.
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molded, or a tool by which they can advance their own conception of the
good life. Treating a child, even a potential child, as a tool causes moral
harm.45 A lively debate exists about how best to characterize that harm,
but the overwhelming consensus is that genetic enhancement causes
moral harm.46
45. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN THE AGE OF GENETIC
ENGINEERING 83 (2007) (identifying harm caused by techniques that require a "persisting negotiation
with the given"); Kathy Davis, The Rhetoric of Cosmetic Surgery: Luxury or Welfare?, in ENHANCING
HUMAN TRAITS: ETHICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 124, 124-34 (Erik Parens ed., 1998) [hereinafter
ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS]. See generally Carol Freedman, Aspirin for the Mind: Some Ethical
Worries About Psychopharmacology, in ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS, supra, at 135, 135-50; Eric T.
Juengst, What Does Enhancement Mean?, in ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS, supra, at 29, 29-47: Anita
Silvers, A Fatal Attraction to Normalizing: Treating Disabilities as Deviations from "Species-Typical"
Functioning, in ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS, supra, at 95, 95-123.
46. See AUDREY R. CHAPMAN, UNPRECEDENTED CHOICES: RELIGIOUS ETHICS AT THE FRONTIERS OF
GENETIC SCIENCE 53 (1999) (arguing that genetic enhancement risks human self-destruction rather
than improvement due to a lack of knowledge surrounding the creation of human life and the
consequences of genetic engineering); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES
OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 217 (2003) (arguing that humanity will be altered beyond
recognition, destroying the foundation of liberal democracy based on the belief that human beings are
equal by nature); L. KAss, THE BEGINNING OF WISDOM 433-34 (2003) (arguing that genetic
enhancement is morally repugnant because it violates nature's moral boundaries and undermines a
moral universe at the most basic of foundations); TED PETERS, PLAYING GOD? 152-53 (2003) (reasoning
that genetic enhancement will alter the portrayal of human beings as equal creatures, causing some to
be viewed as superior to others); SANDEL, supra note 45, at 86 (arguing that existence is a gift and
genetic enhancement jeopardizes "humility, responsibility, and solidarity"); Cynthia B. Cohen &
LeRoy Walters, Gene Transfer for Therapy or Enhancement, in A CHRISTIAN RESPONSE TO NEW
GENETICS 53, 68 (David H. Smith & Cynthia B. Cohen eds., 2003) (arguing that genetic enhancement
would result in social disparities and prejudices, exacerbating the divide between the wealthy and
poor, and will diminish the value of human life); Sarah M. Markwood, Comment, Creating a Perfect
Human Is Not So Perfect: The Case for Restricting Genetic Enhancement Research, 110 PENN ST. L.
REV. °473, 483 (2005) (arguing that genetic enhancement will change the "meaning of human
normality" and transform a child into a commodity); Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Law of the Above
Averages: Leveling the New Genetic Enhancement Playing Field, 85 IOWA L. REV. 517, 533 (2000)
(arguing that "wealth-based access to genetic enhancement" will produce a social inequality; enhanced
individuals will achieve social success more easily than non-enhanced individuals, eventually creating a
political system dominated by "genetic aristocracy or 'genobility"'); David A. Prentice, Brave New
World of Genetic Engineering, 17 ISSUES L. & MED. 312, 314 (2002) (arguing that genetic enhancement
will create a "genetic caste system," will treat children as "manufactured commodities," and will
"degrade human dignity and individuality"); Daniel L. Tobey, What's Really Wrong with Genetic
Enhancement: A Second Look at Our Posthuman Future, 6 YALE J.L. & TECH. 54, 57 (2003) (arguing
that genetic enhancement will undermine "the most basic [and universal] sources of meaning and well-
being in human life"); Dan Brock, Professor, Harvard Med. School, Response to "Or What's a
Heaven For?" Bioscience and Alteration of Human Limits (Nov. 8, 2007), available at
http://www.hds.harvard.edu/cswr/resourceslectures/zoloth.html (expressing a concern that the poor
will be increasingly disadvantaged by not having access to the benefits of genetic enhancement);
William LaFleur, Professor, Univ. Penn., Response to "Or What's a Heaven For?" Bioscience and
Alteration of Human Limits (Nov. 8, 2007), available at http://www.hds.harvard.edu/cswr/resources/
lectures/zoloth.html (arguing that genetic enhancement is a slippery slope, eventually leading to a
"post-human dystopia"); N. Schichor et al., Should We Allow Genetic Engineering? A Public Policy
Analysis of Germline Enhancement, http://8e.devbio.com/article.php?id=172 (last visited Dec. 15,
2008) (arguing that a child's "individual personhood" would be jeopardized by genetic enhancement).
But see NICHOLAS AGAR, LIBERAL EUGENICS: IN DEFENSE OF HUMAN ENHANCEMENT 2-3 (2004); Joseph
(Vol. 60:397
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In addition, modification of a child's DNA causes the future child an
injury to identity. Untouched, the child with DNA for dark skin would
develop a trait that is, for many, integral to identity. The child with the
theoretical homosexual gene would grow up as a gay man or lesbian. The
change to the DNA injures the future child's identity by costing him the
opportunity to live as a person of color, or to live as a gay man or lesbian.
The injury to identity carries with it the real risk of psychological harm.
Although we have no experience with the impact of genetic
modifications to a trait central to a child's identity, the experiences of
intersexed children subjected to genital correction surgery serve as a
cautionary tale. Surgically assigning a gender to a child born with
ambiguous genitals appears to have horrific consequences for some
individuals in the long term.47 The assault to identity causes deep
psychological trauma. It is impossible to know whether genetic
modification of physical traits central to identity will cause psychological
trauma to a child in the long run. The intricate weave of genetics,
environment, and experience that comprise identity is so complex that
we can only guess at the results caused by changing the genetic thread.
The risk of psychological trauma is real. Children should be protected
from that risk, unless it is justified by a weighty therapeutic benefit.
IV. A DISABILITY-SENSITIVE APPROACH
Given the limitations of the open future framework, it is worth
considering whether it is possible to identify a cognizable injury suffered
by a child as a result of direct manipulation of her DNA without
adopting a framework that makes inaccurate and demeaning
assumptions about life with disability. I believe it is. This Part proposes
an approach that is sensitive to the concerns of the disability community,
and more inclusive than an open future approach.
A. DISABILITY-SENSITIVITY IN THE CONTEXT OF GENETIC MANIPULATIONS
FOR DISABILITY
Several principles and goals shape an analytic framework that is
consciously sensitive to the concerns of the disability community. First, a
disability-sensitive approach should not inadvertently or unnecessarily
demean people with disabilities by perpetuating the myth that life with
disability is tragic. Second, a disability-sensitive approach should respect
the inherent dignity, value, autonomy, and individual choices of persons
with disabilities. Third, it should recognize that there is no universal
Jackson, The Amorality of Preference: A Response to the Enemies of Enhancement, 19 J. EVOL. & TECH.
42, 42-50 (2oo8), available at http://jetpress.org/vi9/jackson.htm.
47. E.g., Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, David Reimer's Legacy: Limiting Parental
Discretion, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 5, 21 (2005); Jo Bird, Outside the Law: Intersex, Medicine and
the Discourse of Rights, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 65, 74 (2005).
December 2008]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
experience of being disabled, and that individuals experience disability in
as many ways as individuals experience race, gender, and other traits
fundamental to identity.
As applied to the problem of identifying cognizable harm caused by
genetic interventions, disability sensitivity counsels against singling out
disability as uniquely or necessarily harmful. As such, a disability-
sensitive approach should not distinguish parents who seek genetic
modification for disability from parents who seek genetic modifications
for other traits. The reality is that parents who seek to create a disabling
trait in their future child have determined that life with that trait is in the
best interests of the child. These parents have made a considered
decision that the future child's life will be enhanced by the intervention.
The deaf child will appreciate deaf culture in a way that a hearing child
cannot.45 A dwarf child will get better care from her parents and fit in
better in a home designed for little people. As with a choice to make a
genetically black child white, or a homosexual child heterosexual, the
benefit is in the eye of the beholder. To be sure, the decision to create
the disabling trait in a future child is not one designed to provide
therapeutic benefits to the child, but neither is a decision to modify a
child's DNA to select for race or sexual orientation. In this way, a
decision to choose disability is no different from a decision to use other
genetic enhancements to shape a future child for nontherapeutic
purposes.
For that reason, a disability-sensitive approach would treat a
decision to choose disability the same way it treats the use of other
genetic enhancements.49 It would locate the injury, if any, common to
uses of direct genetic enhancement, and ask if that injury is legally
cognizable. Having identified a cognizable injury, a disability-sensitive
framework would require an individual assessment of whether and how
the manufactured trait has affected the child's life. Any measure of
damages would depend on a showing that the genetic modification had
negative consequences in the life of the particular child.
48. See generally HARLAN LANE, Preface of THE MASK OF BENEVOLENCE: DISABLING THE DEAF
COMMUNITY, at xi-xv (1999) (exploring the benefits of being part of Deaf culture).
49. Although the line between an enhancement and a therapy is sometimes blurry, genetic
shaping of a child's DNA to add a trait that pleases the parent but does not improve functionality is
clearly enhancement.
Not all genetic interventions are enhancements. Many, and for the time being, almost all,
are aimed at treating or preventing disease. A genetic intervention is an "enhancement,"
however, (t) when it is undertaken for the purpose of improving a characteristic or
capability that, but for the enhancement, would lie within what is generally accepted as a
"normal" range for humans; or (2) when it installs a characteristic or capability that is not
normally present in humans.
Mehlman, supra note 46, at 522-23 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 60:397
INSULT TO INJURY
A framework that treats genetic modification as an enhancement
respects the value and inherent dignity of individuals with disabilities,
and rejects the notion that disability is inherently harmful or tragic. It
makes no assumptions about life with disability, and recognizes that
some people experience disabling traits as enriching their lives.
Moreover, a framework that requires individual assessment of
consequential damages allows for the possibility that some children will
experience the disability as a neutral or even positive trait, while
accounting for the reality that some people experience negative
consequences from disability.
B. INTERVENTION AS INJURY
The key to identifying cognizable injury without singling out
disability as a uniquely tragic trait is to ask whether adding, deleting, or
modifying an embryo's DNA to produce the parents' desired genotype is
itself a legal wrong, instead of sorting among manufactured phenotypes
to determine which constitute legally cognizable harms." In other words,
focus on the intervention, not the result of the intervention. Separate the
question of whether there is a harmful touching from the question of
whether touching causes resulting harm. If the intervention itself is a
legal wrong for which the law provides a remedy, a child so afflicted has
suffered cognizable injury and could recover consequential damages for
harm that materializes as a result of the injury.
The law recognizes loss of dignity caused by harmful or offensive
touching as a cognizable injury for which it provides a remedy." A
person is liable to another for battery if "he acts intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third
person [and] a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or
indirectly results."52 Liability attaches without proof of damages or proof
that the actor meant to inflict harm. 3 A person can commit a battery with
the best of intentions. For example, a person trying to help an injured
party can commit a battery,54 and the injury is cognizable even if the
harmful or offensive touching provided the person who was touched
measurable benefits.5 Even a doctor who saves the life of a patient can
commit a battery. 6 The focus is on the fact of the touching, and its
nature. The essence of a claim for battery is "in the offense to the dignity
involved in the unpermitted and intentional invasion of the inviolability
50. Smolensky, supra note I, at 301.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § i8 cmt. c (1965).
52. Id. § 13.
53. Id. § 13 cmt. c.
54. Id.
55. E.g., Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc., 82 A.2d 458, 459-60 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 195 0 .
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. c.
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of his person and not in any physical harm done to his body, it is not
necessary that the plaintiff's actual body be disturbed. 57
In my view, the intentional manipulation of a child's DNA to create
a trait chosen by a parent for no therapeutic reason is a harmful or
offensive contact. As discussed above, the manipulation causes moral
harm, an injury to identity, and lost opportunities for the future child.
Those losses are an affront to dignity of the same kind for which the law
provides a remedy. It is of no moment that the contact with the child's
DNA was intended to enhance the child. Just as a rescuer or surgeon
acting with good intentions can commit battery, an intentional
manipulation of a child's DNA may be an offensive touching despite the
good intentions of the person causing the contact. The contact is
offensive because it modifies the genetic structure of the child's body and
causes an offense to dignity.
C. THE PROBLEM OF CONSENT
Under a traditional claim for battery, there is no liability if the
plaintiff consented to the offensive contact." Obviously, an ex-utero
embryo cannot consent to anything, but its parent can. The question
becomes whether the parent's consent to the intervention is valid. Under
the general rules applicable to medical decision making for a child, it
probably is.59 With very few exceptions, a parent is free to consent to
medical interventions for a child so long as the interventions are
medically appropriate. Absent some consensus among providers that
certain genetic interventions are medically inappropriate or a law or
regulation that specifically prohibits the use of genetic modification of
embryos, parental consent will likely protect a provider from liability for
battery.
That said, there is good reason to question the authority of parents
to consent to the use of untested and potentially harmful interventions to
modify the DNA of a future child based on their own needs or aesthetic
preferences. First, parents may not freely consent to similarly risky,
invasive, and permanent interventions that provide no therapeutic
benefit to the child. For example, a parent cannot enroll a child in
nontherapeutic research protocols that involve more than minimal risks.6
They often need court approval to sterilize their daughters, 6' and may
need court approval to make their children organ donors.6' The same
57. Id. § 18 cmt. c.
58. Id. § 13 cmt. d.
59. For a general overview, see Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by
Children: Tensions Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311,314-18 (1994).
60. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401-.409 (2007).
6I. See, e.g., In re Hayes, 6o8 P.2d 635,637 (Wash. 198o).
62. For a synthesis of the cases addressing the use of children as organ donors, see Michelle
Goodwin, The Politics of Health Law: My Sister's Keeper? Law, Children, and Compelled Donation, 29
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concerns that justify limitations on parental consent in those cases apply
here: the interventions are risky, the risk is not balanced by therapeutic
benefit, the parents' ability to serve as the advocate of the child's best
interests is suspect, and the interventions could be abused.
Moreover, some decisions are simply not a parent's to make. A
parent cannot, for example, force a child to get married. Nor can a parent
decide to refuse life-saving treatment for a child. 6' The decision about
whom to marry and whether or not to refuse treatment necessary to
maintain life are held in trust by the parent until the child is able to
exercise them as an adult. Decisions regarding marriage and the refusal
of life-sustaining treatment are so fundamental to a child's identity and
future in life that a parent has no right to make them for the child. The
decision to change a child's DNA also has significant implications for a
child's identity and future in life. Such decisions should rest with the
parent only if a medical or other necessary reason triggers the need for
an immediate decision. Absent the need for intervention, when
intervention is sought to "improve" a child for cultural or aesthetic
reasons, a decision to modify a future child's DNA is not a parent's to
make.
64
CONCLUSION
Incorporating the disability perspective into an analysis of the
potential harm to a child done by preimplantation manipulation of
embryos requires a shift in focus from that suggested by Professor
Smolensky. Rather than sorting among manufactured phenotypes to
identify those that constitute harms, a disability-sensitive framework
would treat the infliction of a trait for disability no differently from the
infliction of other traits manufactured in children to satisfy an aesthetic,
cultural, or societal preference of the parent and seek to locate harm
common to those procedures. Applying such a framework, I have argued
that although parents seek such traits to enhance the future child's life,
the act of manipulating the child's DNA is itself harmful and risky, and
absent a clear therapeutic purpose, is unjustified and offensive. Tort
damages might be available to children subjected to such unjustified and
offensive interventions, but no child, including a child with a
manufactured disability, should be allowed to recover more than nominal
damages without proof that the manufactured trait affected his or her life
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 357, 365-77 (2007).
63. Wadlington, supra note 59, at 318, 320, 325, 331 (discussing cases that allowed court
intervention for life-threatening situations).
64. 1 expand on this argument in Alicia R. Ouelette, Eyes Wide Open: Surgery to Westernize the
Eyes of Asian Child. 39 HASTINGS CENTER REP. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at i5-18, on file with
author).
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negatively. There should be no assumption that life with disability is
inherently tragic.
In the end, no child may ever recover legal damages for the harm
caused by the intentional manipulation of his or her genes. The road to
recovery is littered with issues ranging from the legal status of the
embryo to the application of parental immunity laws to the problem of
consent. Any number of issues could block recovery. Nonetheless, the
effort to identify when and how children are harmed or put at risk of
harm by genetic modifications may help guide regulators, legislators, and
courts as they grapple with the issues. My hope is that resulting policy
will both protect children, and remain sensitive to the implications for
persons with disabilities.
